A Nice Piece By Vir Singhvi

We need the paramilitary forces just as much as we need the army (NEW) Posted By: Vir Sanghvi | Posted On: 09 Apr 2010 07:55 PM | Views: 6402 Am I the only person to think that there is something strange about our attitude to the paramilitary forces? We worship our regular armed forces, routinely referring to our army as the ‘finest army in the world’ and treating it as the symbol of Indian patriotism and pride. But the paramilitary forces are a different matter altogether. This was driven home to me by the way in which we responded to the murder of 74 (or perhaps more; there seems to be no universally accepted figure) paramilitary jawans by Maoists in Chhatisgarh. The number is not small. In the entire Kargil operation, the Indian army lost 585 men. Here, these jawans lost their lives in a single ambush. And yet, our reactions ranged from ‘it is time to crackdown on these Maoists’ (the most common response) to ‘these men were there to attack the Maoists so they should have expected to be ambushed’ (the view of a radical chic lunatic fringe). Imagine now how we would have reacted if over 70 Indian army jawans had been killed within a few hours. Not only would the outrage have been greater but we would have focused more on the individual victims, their stories, the families they left behind, etc. But in the case of the paramilitary jawans, we acted as though they were cannon fodder and TV discussions focused on their foolishness (or the stupidity of their commanders) in walking into the Maoist ambush. In contrast, it is a well-established principle of discourse in India that you can never criticize the army, call its officers stupid or draw attention to any mistakes it might have made. As far as we are concerned, the army can do no wrong. The paramilitary forces, however, are not treated with any such deference. You saw this in the way their commanders behaved in the aftermath of Kargil. Anybody who dared suggest that the Generals had screwed up by looking the other way when the Pakistanis took over our bunkers was treated as a traitor by the army. Here, the commanders of the paramilitary outfits struggle to find explanations to satisfy their critics. In the aftermath of the Maoist attack, the Chief of Air Staff was asked about the possibility of air cover to support an offensive against the Naxals. He ruled it out arguing that the Air Force was not meant to be used against our own people. (Perhaps only the army, which has been used in Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Kashmir and many other places, is meant for this purpose judging by the Air Chief’s assertion.) Can you imagine the head of any paramilitary force daring to talk this way? The poor man would lose his job instantly. We see the difference in the way we react to jawans from the paramilitary forces. When we go to the airport and are stopped by CISF jawans, we cooperate grudgingly. We neither respect them in the way that we would respect jawans from the regular army nor are we intimidated by them as we would be if they were policemen. "The CRPF may not be as glamorous as the Indian army. But its men shed blood so that you and I can be safe." All criticism has to follow a similar double standard. In the aftermath of 26/11, all of us were (quite justifiably) critical of the Bombay police who flopped spectacularly. But even as we rushed to condemn the police we were less willing to criticize the navy even though its commandos had behaved disgracefully by holding a press conference and hogging the limelight even while the operation was still in progress. Those who were at all critical of the navy (such as myself) faced a barrage of protest. Nor were we allowed to say very much about the then naval chief, a boorish loudmouth, who attacked the media for no logical reason. (He was rewarded by being appointed High Commissioner while the Bombay policemen were sacked and the head of the NSG – a paramilitary outfit of sorts – was allowed to retire without any of the rewards that were his due even though it was his force that successfully cleared the Taj, the Oberoi and Nariman House). Why do we feel so differently about paramilitary forces? Why are they so rarely accorded the deference and respect that the armed forces take for granted? It is a tough one so let’s take it bit by bit. First of all, I actually approve of the exaggerated deference with which we treat the armed forces. I do not believe that the Indian army is actually the finest fighting force in the world or that all of its officers are spotlessly clean. (Look at the recent corruption scandal in the top echelons of the army.) But I do believe that India owes a huge debt to our armed forces. Elsewhere in the sub-continent, the army has been lured into governance. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi armies have staged coups. The Sri Lankan army is uncomfortably close to wanting a share of power. And the Nepal army is a player in the country’s politics. One reason why India has remained a democracy is because our army has remained far away from politics, even when it has had to suffer insults from the political class. If the price we have to pay for this is an exaggerated deference for the army, then it is a small price. We have much to thank the army for. But why then does this deference not extend to the paramilitary forces? One of the reasons, I suspect, is sheer ignorance. We can all name the Service Chiefs but how many of us can name the heads of the CRPF, the BSF, the CISF or the NSG? As far as we are concerned, these forces are not on our radar. Few of us even know what the CRPF does or how the BSF is constituted. Paramilitary forces do not have parades that are widely covered, they are little written about and few of them bother to brag about victories or triumphs. Another reason is that while we see the army as being distinct from the corrupt Indian system of governance (which, by and large, it is), we see the police as being as tainted and corrupted as the political class. And many of the paramilitary forces seem to us to be no more than fancy police battalions. The CRPF is actually the Central Reserve Police Force, and the BSF, CISF and NSG usually have police officers in key posts. Thus these forces are not seen as being at all like the army and suffer accordingly in public esteem. A third reason is that we are not clear what we have to thank the paramilitary for. We know that we remain a secure and independent country because the army guards our borders and fights our enemies. But what do these forces do? How do their actions benefit us? The truth, of course, is that we should be grateful to these forces. Neither the air force nor the navy have had to do very much since 1971. But the paramilitary forces risk their lives fighting for our safety every day – as the deaths of CRPF jawans in the Maoist ambush demonstrate. There was a time when our enemies were without. But now they are within. And so we need the paramilitary just as much as we need the army. The armed forces fight for us once every decade. These guys do it all the time. So the time has come for us to rethink our attitudes to these forces and to care more for those jawans who are left bleeding by India’s internal enemies. The CRPF may not be as glamorous as the Indian army. But its men shed blood so that you and I can be safe. View Associated Article Comments HOWLER 11 Apr 2010 Remember, Kargil was intrusions into your own territory right under Army’s nose! And in a situation where the “elite”, lean, mean and “professionally trained” Indian Army was sitting right there to arrest any such attempt & to repulse it. So, our “well trained” Army acted thoroughly “professionally” in first allowing the intrusions to take place and our own posts to be occupied by the enemy and took heavy casualties in cleaning its own created shit! HOWLER 11 Apr 2010 The brouhaha that has been created regarding the capabilities of CRPF or other paramilitary forces in the light of CRPFs tragedy in Dantewada is sheer nonsensical and totally detached from the ground situation. To say CRPF or any other paramilitary force is poorly trained and is afflicted by poor leadership is only partially correct. Holding CRPF responsible for its own deaths is only as much true as holding Army responsible for its own deaths in the Kargil operations. valour-arjun 10 Apr 2010 Nice article, Vir. When Institutions such as IISS compare the military strengths they actually count the paramilitary. Given the variety of Jobs paramilitary are involved in, I agree, they should be taken care of and well respected just as the regular army.